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Reconciliation and the Goguryeo/Gāogōulì Disputes between China and South 
Korea 
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Abstract: 
 
Just as the failure to reconcile views of the past and to address historical injustice has 
damaged inter-state relations in East Asia, the Goguryeo/Gāogōulì dispute has harmed 
relations between South Korea and China. In this chapter, we provide a detailed analysis 
of the dispute, and explore how this contestation has been reconciled through elite 
settlement, UNESCO's arbitration and the idea of shared history.  
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Introduction  
 
History tends to be written for specific audiences, and the Goguryeo/Gāogōulì1 dispute 
between Korea and China is no exception. According to Chase, 'shared stories of the 
past are a primary source of national identity'.2 All histories are contemporary histories, 
or the history of ideas.3 In the eyes of Oakeshott,4 historians create history through their 
writing. If the writing of history is predominantly the remit of state elites, the facts at 
the heart of nationalist narratives may be fabricated and lack deliberative qualities. And 
if history is re-imagined and re-written free of competing voices, it is vulnerable to 
'mythmaking'. That is, the 'divergence of national memories created by elite historical 
mythmaking' has 'perpetuated and reinforced the problems of history'5  in relations 
between East Asian states. In China, for instance, 'historical writing... has been closely 
linked to elite political power'.6 
 
East Asian history – particularly the legitimacy of national boundaries and political units 
– has been fiercely contested since the Pacific War (1941–45). The aftermath of the war 
witnessed the emergence and re-emergence of independent nation-states, which have 
appropriated that trauma and used it to forge new identities. History plays a significant 
role in nation building and the construction of identities, but it has also hindered regional 
integration. The nationalist politics of history is often deliberately subjective, and 
distorts the past.7 History may legitimate territorial claims, and nationalists often appeal 
to historical 'facts', but Renan noted a century ago 'Getting history wrong is an essential 
part of being a nation'.8 
 
The Goguryeo/Gāogōulì dispute is a primary instance of history being a source of 
tension and animosity in East Asia. The names of the disputed kingdom are based on 
the same Chinese characters (高句麗) but are pronounced differently in each language. 
Both sides agree that Goguryeo/Gāogōulì survived for seven centuries, from about 
37BC until 668AD. The kingdom is commonly agreed to have occupied territories that 
are now recognized as Manchuria in northern China and the Korean Peninsula. 
Goguryeo is of great historical importance to Korea, being one of the kingdoms (along 
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with Silla and Baekche) that were unified and formed the Goryeo dynasty (918–
1392AD). For Koreans, Goguryeo is intrinsically linked to nationhood and identity 
formation. China, in contrast, claims that Gāogōulì was but one territory that forms part 
of the multi-millennial, multicultural Chinese civilizational sphere. In this view, China 
is a super-state that has absorbed minority peoples. This is a political principle to which 
most Chinese people subscribe.9  
 
The historical dispute involves the possession – both in the physical and spiritual sense 
– of cultural assets derived from long-extinct civilizations. China and the Koreas both 
claim to be the legitimate heirs to a kingdom that occupied certain parts of what are 
now northern China and the Korean peninsula. In addition to the Goguryeo–Gāogōulì 
dispute, there are other disputed issues such as the lineage of Confucius, the poet Qu 
Yuan, Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong, traditional medicine, calligraphy and the Dragon 
Boat (Dano/Duanwu, 端午) Festival between Korea and China.10 What makes the 
Goguryeo dispute unique is that in securing a claim to the history of an ancient 
civilization, governments have sought to eliminate competing claims in the present to 
their sovereign right to the territories where those civilizations existed – and all people, 
natural resources and other assets within those territories. What Koreans refer to as the 
Goguryeo kingdom encapsulates territory within China's present borders, but Koreans 
have not – as yet – sought to reclaim that territory. They have, however, sought to lay 
claim to the history of the kingdom. China is intent on preventing any claims by Korea 
to lands now under Chinese jurisdiction. Moreover, the dispute concerns historical 
memory and legacy: how an ancient kingdom relates to the present-day identities of 
China and Korea. In seeking to 'gain control of their past and explore their heritages',11 
these two states have made competing and seemingly mutually exclusive claims about 
the history of the kingdom. 
 
After the dispute erupted in an uncontrolled manner via online forums, leaders from 
both societies attempted to re-appropriate the debate and reach an elite settlement. This 
fits well a general pattern whereby national leaders and elites have been critical in 
handling the politicization of the past (see Chapter X in this volume), and the identity 
conflicts it causes. A collection of essays on the politicization of history confirmed that 
efforts by political leaders are critical in controlling the retelling of the past and in 
achieving justice.12 Germany took great efforts to face up to traumatic history of the 
World War II, openly made an official apology in dealing with the legacies of Nazi 
fascism.13 Japanese political leaders have also become more conscious of regional 
reactions to how history textbooks represent events of the war. In 1998, former Prime 
Minister Keizo Obuchi offered South Korean President Kim Dae-jung 'a written 
apology… for past sufferings' which Japan caused its neighbors prior to and during the 
war. Further, 'Kim accepted with sincerity this statement of Obuchi's recognition of 
history and expressed his appreciation for it'.14 Unfortunately the momentum towards 
reconciliation did not continue. Former prime minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, 
made several visits to Yasukuni Shrine between 2001 and 2006, in order to secure the 
electoral support of right-wing groups such as the Association of Bereaved Families. 
The current prime minister, Shinzo Abe, also visited the shrine in December 2013. In a 
comprehensive study of the Pacific War, Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun (see Chapter X) 
argued that Yasukuni acts as a symbolic impediment to better relations with its 
neighbors.15 That is, visits to the shrine by Japanese leaders, and the vitriolic response 
from their Chinese and Korean counterparts, were not conducive to the resolution of 
history disputes.  
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In contrast, both China and South Korea have made a conciliatory effort to settle down 
the Goguryeo/Gāogōulì dispute; this result has not followed the prediction that 'a 
dangerous cycle of existential conflict is likely to ensue'.16 This chapter will study how 
Goguryeo/Gāogōulì became a source of tension between South Korea and how this 
issue is reconciled and managed. It proceeds as follows. The next two sections review 
how Chinese and Korean scholars have interpreted the history of Goguryeo/Gāogōulì, 
and thereby identify how the dispute is situated within the wider memory problems in 
East Asia. The chapter next analyzes how this seemingly intractable Goguryeo dispute 
was managed through a compromise between China and Korea. In the conclusion, we 
account for the three factors or mechanisms that facilitate the reconciliation of historical 
disputes. 
 
 
Chinese perspectives on the kingdom  
 
Tang-era (618–907AD) records referred to Goguryeo, Silla and Baekje as 'the three 
kingdoms east of the sea' (海東三國). The Han and Tang courts did not consider Korea 
to be part of China, and instead referred to it as an 'eastern barbarian' state.17 Similarly, 
Chinese records refer to the Balhae kingdom, the successor to Goguryeo, as a non-
Chinese state. Balhae was referred to as 'the flourishing kingdom east of the sea' (海東
盛國), adding further weight to the claim that it was separate from China.18 
 
In 1934, Lu Simian, a Chinese historian, wrote a book of Chinese nationalities including 
a lengthy discussion about Gāogōulì. He examined Chinese and Korean sources to trace 
the origin and evolution of Gāogōulì. Lu mentioned that the Han dynasty established a 
county government there.19 Fan Wenlan, a famous Marxist historian, endorsed the 
principle that because China is a multi-ethnic state, all minorities ought to be treated 
equally. He called Sui's war against Gāogōulì an invasion and regarded Tang-era 
Emperor Tachong's war against Goguryeo as unjust, which led his failure to conquer 
Gāogōulì in 644AD. 20  These two famous historians struggled with the historical 
question of how to treat Goguryeo. Both regarded it as one of China's nationalities, but 
they did not define Goguryeo as a 'Chinese regional dynasty' or a 'local kingdom under 
the auspices of the ruling authorities of ancient China'. 
 
In the late 1990s, Chinese developed a revisionist view of the kingdom's history. At a 
symposium on Gāogōulì held at Tunghua University in 1998, Han Zhongfu proposed 
that Gāogōulì was a provincial state (a 'local regime') which an ancient Chinese tribe 
founded; and that it was a provincial Chinese state that later became a neighboring (non-
Chinese) state, following the relocation of its capital from Jian to Pyongyang.21 Chinese 
historians 'cite the evidence of tribute and investiture' to argue that Goguryeo shared a 
'subordinate relationship' 22  with China. They also, however, reflect China's long-
standing self-image as a Confucian moral exemplar to other states, such as Korea. 
Chinese school textbooks in the 1930s and 1940s, for instance, referred to Gāogōulì 
and Balhae as kingdoms that Chinese culture 'assimilated' or 'absorbed'. Due to Sino-
centrism, the distinction between ethnic minorities and foreign states is often blurred to 
Chinese eyes.23 
 
In particular, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has organized the Northeast 
Project which focused on China's borders with the two Koreas, together with other 
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research projects on China's borders with Russia and Mongolia, as well as Tibet and 
Xinjiang. Importantly, three heads of the department of propaganda in three northeast 
Chinese provinces have been involved in the Northeast Project on Goguryeo. 
 
In response to it, the Korean side berated China for 'stealing' Korean history, and 
responded by establishing the Goguryeo Research Foundation in 2004. The Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Culture chaired meetings relating to the history project, 
underlining the importance of the issue at that time.24 
 
The dispute intensified due to the competing bids by China and North Korea to have 
Goguryeo artefacts listed by UNESCO as world cultural heritage sites. North Korea's 
bid to include Goguryeo murals in the north of the Korean peninsula listed by UNESCO 
as worthy of world heritage protection in 2003 elicited a response from China, which 
lodged a claim in relation to Gāogōulì castles and tombs located in Manchuria. The 
South Korean government supported the North's bid, supplying $100,000 a year in aid 
for the conservation of Goguryeo tombs. The dispute escalated when South Korean 
scholars viewed China's claim in light of the expanding Northeast Project, under the 
aegis of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which intended to strengthen Chinese 
claims to Gāogōulì. China refused to allow Korean survey teams to inspect Goguryeo 
sites and artifacts, and to verify or disprove Chinese assertions that the artifacts were of 
Chinese origin. Chinese scholars associated with the Northeast Project also claimed that 
Gojoseon, Gando and Balhae were of Chinese origin, which raised tensions with Korea 
even further.25 
 
Arguably, the main motivation for Chinese claims to Gāogōulì was to strengthen its 
claims to its northeast territories for fear that a reunified Korea might seek to 
appropriate some parts of Manchuria. Specifically, China sought 'historical justification 
for the modern-day inclusion of ethnic Koreans and other minorities, as well as their 
territories' into the PRC. 26  Modern conceptions of the nation-state, which imply 
exclusive sovereignty over a fixed territory and a population sharing a common 
language and culture, were applied to events that occurred at a time when borders and 
sovereignty were far looser concepts. 27  Yi In-cheol, of the Goguryeo Research 
Foundation, argued that 'Chinese history precisely is ''not'' the history of today's 
China… [this] vision of history… is utterly territory-centered… History is not the sum 
of past events taking place within a defined area of land, but an aggregate of human 
actions and affairs'.28 
 
The main motivation of China's claim to Gāogōulì is territorial, but the driving force 
behind it has been associated with Chinese continuing struggle with its own modern 
conception of national identity. Given the fact that China inherited the territories of 
Qing dynasty, modern China cannot build its nation upon a narrow Han nationalism. 
Consequently China has revised historical texts and historical evaluations. For example, 
Zen Guofan, who served the Qing and defeated a peasant rebellion was regarded as a 
Han traitor, but now is embraced as a great Chinese national hero.29 With regards to the 
Gāogōulì issue, even in the 1930s under the Republic of China, Gāogōulì was treated 
as an ethnic minority. Those scholars who hold the view that Gāogōulì is China’s 
minority regime just follow the intellectual extreme logic of China's national identity 
building without considering the feelings of Koreans. 
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Korean perspectives on the kingdom 
 
Most Korean historians argue that Goguryeo was a kingdom inhabitants of the Korean 
peninsula founded, and that refugees from Goguryeo proceeded to found the Balhae 
and Goryeo kingdoms, forerunners to the modern Korean state. For these reasons, they 
contend that the kingdom was wholly or predominantly Korean.30 According to Cho 
Bob-jeong of Woosuk University, 'Korean history developed along the lines of Dangun 
Joseon-Gojoseon-Yemaek and Buyeo-Goguryeo-Balhae… the Korean view of history 
has been maintained for more than 1,000 years and the Chinese and Japanese history 
documents also support this part of Korean history'.31 Official Korean histories, such as 
the Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms and History of the Three Kingdoms (Samguk 
yusa and Samguk sagi) contain numerous references to the historical continuity of 
Goguryeo and modern Korean states. These histories refer to battles between Goguryeo 
and various Chinese regimes and therefore an assertion of Korean identity over the 
kingdom. In this view, Goryeo's naming was a clear indication that the new state was 
the successor to the northern origins of Goguryeo.32 
 
For then-South Korean foreign minister Ban Ki-moon, the Goguryeo issue 'is directly 
related to the roots and identity of the entire Korean people'.33 In other words, the issue 
relates to historical memory rather than territorial claims. According to one Korean 
writer, Manchuria 'disappeared from Korean history after the fall of the Balhae 
kingdom' 34 . Given that Goguryeo occupied a specific physical space, however, 
territorial aspects of the dispute are also relevant (cf. Chapter X for Koreans' 
imagination of Manchuria). 
 
Korean historiography depicts Goguryeo as a powerful, independent Korean kingdom. 
Nationalist historians of the early 20th century, especially Shin Chae-ho, sought to 
promote a racially defined national identity at a time when Korea's very independence 
as a people and a state was under threat. For Shin, a homogeneous and inclusive Korean 
race could trace its historical trajectory back to its mythical Tangun founder, through 
Goguryeo, and onwards to modern Korea.35  Korean nationalists have 'de-centered 
China', and emphasised the Manchurian region's centrality to Korean history and 
identity: the dynasties of Goguryeo, Gojoseon, Balhae and Goryeo can be traced to the 
region.36 
 
Some Koreans regarded an article published in Guanming Daily as 'a declaration of 
war'. 37  Park Sun-young from Pohang University of Science and Technology, for 
example, asserted: 'China has declared a ''history war'', into which other countries, in 
particular Korea, find themselves unwillingly being drawn into'. The Northeast Project 
was a 'politically motivated undertaking' that aims to reinforce 'the political influence 
of the Chinese leadership in regard to assuring national integrity, unity and stability'.38 
For another Korean historian, 'the project is not simple historical research. Its ultimate 
goal is to come up with weapons of historical theories for contemporary political 
needs',39 such as promoting a sense of unity among ethnic minorities in northeast China 
and combatting attempts by 'hostile forces' to interfere in what China claims are its 
internal affairs. Koreans also objected to claims by Chinese historians such as Geng 
Tiehua (a recipient of support from the Northeast Project), that because Goguryeo was 
an ancient tribe from northeast China, Korea did not have a legitimate claim to its 
cultural heritage, despite the transfer of the kingdom's capital to Pyongyang.40 
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A joint seminar by Korean academic societies in late 2003 was held in order to 'counter 
China's distortions of Goguryeo history'. 41  Korean scholars accused their Chinese 
counterparts of being in the service of an overtly political agenda. According to Yeo 
Ho-kyu (professor of history, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies), 'The theory of a 
unified multi-ethnic nation is nothing more than a ''territory-first historical outlook'' that 
attempts to determine the nature and course of history solely on the basis of 
contemporary domain, ignoring the legitimate movers and flows of history'.42 
 
Korean scholars criticized publications sponsored by the Northeast Project for their 
'selective and discriminate use of Chinese sources and disregard of epigraphic 
evidence'.43 Yi In-cheol claimed that Chinese scholars such as Liu Ju presented a 
misleading interpretation of Goguryeo history, and one that was intended to convey the 
impression that the kingdom was a provincial state of China. According to Yi, 
Goguryeo never entered into tributary relations with China.44 Claims that Goguryeo 
belongs rightfully to Chinese history, Korean scholars argued, rely heavily on a short 
passage in Jin Yifu's Comprehensive history of the Northeast (Dongbei Tongshi), a 
patriotic historiography written in 1941 when China was at war with Japan: the people 
of Goguryeo 'came from Puyo and they are a part of our ''zhonghua minzu [Chinese 
ethnicity].'' Koguryŏ is the oldest of the states established in the Northeast region'.45 
 
Korean historians noted specific instances of what they claimed were a distortion of 
Goguryeo history, such as the kingdom's defiance of Chinese orders to join in military 
action against Xiongnu in 12AD. Ma Dejian argued that Goguryeo was subordinate to 
China, and that Goguryeo's leader was killed for defying China.46  An alternative 
interpretation, however, was that Goguryeo defied the directive of China, retaliated 
against Chinese settlements, and killed a local governor.47 Another volume sponsored 
by the Northeast Project emphasized the tributary relations between China and 
Goguryeo, and downplayed the kingdom's resistance to Chinese invasions and 
attacks. 48  Korean scholars such as Im Ki-hwan, professor of history at Hanshin 
University, argued that tributary relations were 'a diplomatic formality' practiced 
throughout East Asia at the time (see Chapter X). It was 'logically inconsistent to single 
out Goguryeo' and treat it as a provincial regime.49 
 
A defining feature of the Goguryeo dispute was the intensity of online discussions 
between Chinese and Korean netizens. South Korean netizens waged campaigns to 
press Korea's claims to Goguryeo. Chinese netizens responded in kind, leading to a 
series of highly charged online spats. Rather than engendering a more critical evaluation 
of the competing historical claims, online debates about the disputed kingdom resulted 
in the exaggeration of foreign threats, the demonization or mis-characterization of 
dissenting opinions, and the unwillingness and inability of nationalists to critically 
examine orthodox views of national history.50 
 
 
Reconciliation: Shared History and Dual Legacy  
 
Elite Compromise 
In early 2004 the South Korean minister for culture and tourism, Lee Chang-dong, 
criticized the 'heated media coverage' of the dispute.51 The South Korean and Chinese 
governments recognized the potential of the dispute to damage bilateral ties. According 
to Kim Tae-ho of Hallym University, 'Korea and China… understand that the issue, if 
   
 - 7 - 
left alone, would destroy ties'.52 On 22 August 2004, Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs from China, visited Seoul, and reached a verbal agreement with his 
counterpart from South Korea after nine hours of discussion.53 China agreed to 'make 
efforts to correct existing distortions' published on a state-run website, and avoid 
'additional distortion of interpretation of Goguryeo's history', as the first steps to 
implementing the verbal agreement with South Korea. The Korean side monitored 
implementation of the agreement, and noted corrections to various websites and 
deletions of offending articles and signage in the vicinity of historical artefacts.54 
 
Since this agreement, China has adopted the following measures including the 
alteration of the Foreign Ministry website's distorted contents in August 2004, the 
deletion of the People's Education Press website's distorted contents in September 2004, 
the correction of Xinhua News Agency website's introductory section in January 2005, 
and the deletion of Xinhua News Agency internet edition's distorted article in July 
2005.55 
 
The reconciliation between two governments has cooled down the scorching dispute. 
This relatively success is due to the prudent political elites from both China and South 
Korea. Wen Jiabao, the former Chinese premier, intervened in this matter and gave an 
order to settle the dispute. It is vital for both state leaders to make a compromise as East 
Asian states oversee the preparation of school history textbooks, and history as an 
academic discipline has been used to construct a linearity of collective memory. 
 
The conciliatory idea of shared history  
The significance of Goguryeo to the formation of national identity in China and Korea 
contributed to the intensification of the dispute. It is mutually incompatible and 
irreconcilable for Korea to claim that the kingdom is solely Korean, and for China to 
argue that it is solely the inheritance of China. Rigidly dichotomous views of history 
(whereby Goguryeo is purported to belong solely either to China or to Korea) result 
only in the perpetuation of inter-state tensions. The solution lies in developing a 
reconcilable and agreeable idea by both sides. Such an idea is that of shared history and 
dual inheritance. 
 
During a conference in 2004 held in Yanji, Li Sheng, a member of Northeast Project 
Expert Panel, expressed a conciliatory view of Gāogōulì: that China and Korea share 
the history of the kingdom.56 Jiang Mengshan is credited with proposing the theory of 
'one history shared by two states' (一史两用論), or a 'dual inheritance' that more than 
one modern state can claim. According to Jiang, Gāogōulì ruled territories situated in 
modern-day Korea and China, its political, economic and cultural centre shifted from 
Jian to Pyongyang, its people moved to China after the fall of the kingdom, and it 
maintained tributary relations with various Chinese dynasties. Scholars who hold this 
position (most of whom are Korean–Chinese scholars from northeastern China) 
acknowledge the legitimacy of Korean claims, but maintain that the kingdom 'belongs 
first to Chinese history and then to Korean history'. For this reason, they argue, the 
history of Gāogōulì 'should be the ''one history shared by two states'''.57 
 
Reconciliation requires the Korean side to be comfortable with the notion of shared 
history. Fortunately enough, there is limited and conditional support in Korea for this 
notion. For Park Doo-bok of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 
'ancient history can be shared'. According to Park, 'complex historical processes… have 
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occurred during the development of human civilization', and 'existing national 
boundaries are also a product of such historical developments'.58 For another Korean 
scholar, it was completely understandable that the kingdom should be remembered 
differently by China and Korea: 'Chinese historians have clearly concluded that the 
history of Goguryeo is an integral element of Korean history and at the same time also 
a part of the history of China's northeastern region'. It would be 'unrealistic to attempt 
to separate the history of Goguryeo from China's historical boundaries, for as long as 
the northeastern region remains part of Chinese sovereign territory'.59 A new history 
textbook even urged Koreans to revisit their view of Balhae, and to see it as a multiracial 
empire founded by the heirs and refugees of Goguryeo which had previously subjugated 
the Mohe/Malgal people of northern China. In other words, Koreans were encouraged 
to shift somewhat from the conventional view of themselves as a culturally 
homogenous group.60 
 
Consequently, the history of Goguryeo was reconsidered in less absolutist zero-sum 
terms. According to Lim Jie-hyun, professor of history at Hanyang University, 
 
The battle is very unhistorical. In fact, it doesn't make sense to 
distinguish between Korean and Chinese surrounding the 
history. At that time, there existed neither China nor Korea. 
What existed was only Goguryeo. We have to return the history 
of Goguryeo to the folks of Goguryeo (not the Chinese or 
Koreans).61 
 
The intense debates about relations between Goguryeo and various Chinese dynasties 
also had the useful effect of highlighting to scholars in both China and South Korea that 
it is difficult to draw clear and uncontestable links between the long-extinct kingdom 
and various Chinese dynasties. It is unrealistic and unfair to expect a group of people 
to willingly cede territories over which they have exercised ownership for a lengthy 
period of time purely based on competing historical claims. 
 
The problem here is that modern conceptions of the nation-state, which imply exclusive 
sovereignty over a fixed territory and a population sharing a common language or 
culture, have been applied to events that occurred at a time when borders and 
sovereignty were far looser concepts. 62  It is questionable at best to apply the 
contemporary ideal-type conception of the nation-state to modes of political 
organization in the distant past, especially given that the Sino–Korean border was only 
formalized in its current terms early in the 20th century.63 
 
International Implications 
China and South Korea are not the only two states to contest sovereignty of both past 
and present borders. As Wang reminds us, 'History education is no longer a domestic 
issue in East Asia'.64 To handle historical disputes successfully, it may be necessary to 
have mediation from the international community.65 In July 2004 UNESCO reached a 
decision that alleviated some of the tensions in the Goguryeo dispute: it accepted both 
sets of claims in relation to the remains of the capital cities, mountain fortresses and 
tombs that China and North Korea had submitted. Rather than declaring that Goguryeo 
belonged exclusively to either one side or the other, UNESCO had declared that both 
sets of claims had some validity. 
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The decision provided a degree of international legitimacy for the idea of shared history 
discussed above; and it helped to reconcile this historical dispute. In contrast, 
UNESCO's decision on the inscription of Preas Vihear temple on 8 July 2008 
intensified the historical dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. Thai Foreign 
Minister Nappadon Pattama initially supported Cambodia's bid for World Heritage 
Listing. However, the Thai Constitutional Court ruled that the foreign minister had 
violated Article 190 of Thailand's 2007 Constitution, which calls for a public debate 
and Cabinet-level approval. As a result Nappadon Pattama resigned over the listing of 
Preah Vihear by UNESCO on 10 July 2008. Since then Thai government has claimed 
its historical territories and even sent over 1,000 troops to defend the temple.  
 
International arbitration helped facilitate a compromise in the Goguryeo/Gāogōulì case, 
but it was less effective in the dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. Specific issues, 
such as the loss of several lives on the Thai and Cambodian sides, and the appointment 
of exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra as an advisor to the Cambodian 
government,66 added a degree of tension to the temple dispute that was absent in the 
case of Goguryeo/Gāogōulì. Another difference was that the Thai–Cambodian dispute 
centered on a single tangible site, whereas the Sino–Korean case entailed a much wider 
expanse and range of artefacts. The temple dispute revolved around a single site, so 
international arbitration was in essence a 'zero-sum game' in which there could be only 
one winner. The notion of shared history, by contrast, was developed with the express 
intention of allowing both sides to 'win' insofar as they could incorporate the kingdom 
into their own historical accounts. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The outcome of the Goguryeo dispute was a compromise. Three sets of actors 
contributed to the partial reconciliation. At the international level, UNESCO's judgment 
that both sets of claims had some validity helped both sides to reach compromise. At 
the national level, state leaders in China and Korea cooperated to resolve the matter 
after parallel domestic dialogues – or perhaps more strictly, monologues – degenerated 
in such a way that bilateral relations were damaged. At the societal level, the Chinese 
scholars have developed the notion of the 'shared history' of Goguryeo/Gāogōulì; while 
some Korean scholars were comfortable with and supported it. These three sets of 
actors worked together to find and develop a fruitful way to resolve issues surrounding 
ancient kingdoms. So far both sides have managed to control the dispute; for example, 
the dispute over Goguryeo was not mentioned in the Modern History of East Asia, a 
historical textbook jointly produced by scholars and civil society from China, South 
Korea and Japan.67 The Chinese government has also respected the settlement reached 
in 2004. The prediction on a dangerous cycle of conflicts does not happen. The 
successful reconciliation of this dispute may offer valuable lessons to the other 
historical disputes in East Asia, and the key to reconciliation is the idea of shared 
history. In this world, East Asians have to share common and overlapping history to 
reduce conflicts.  
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